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The natural space radiation environment can be considered harsh for semiconductor electronics that make up 
SmallSat instruments and systems. Radiation effects impact Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) 
device performance in multiple ways: semiconductor material degradation and charge creation within the 
device. SmallSats usually achieve their goals by utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, which 
can be considered more susceptible to radiation effects than high reliability components which have higher piece 
part costs. The impacts can accrue over the mission life or have instantaneous repercussions, thus, they are 
highly dependent on the mission environment. Unique mission launch date (period within the solar cycle), 
duration, and destination (orbit) determine the resultant radiation hazard. SmallSats are seeking a way to plan 
for operation in environments beyond low inclination, Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and short lifetime. In order to 
succeed with budget and schedule limitations experienced on the SmallSat paradigm, they will need to adopt 
practices of radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Radiation requirements and testing need to be tailored such 
that they do not impose overburden. 
INTRODUCTION 
System-level radiation requirements can drive test 
and assurance methodologies for microelectronic and 
photonic devices that must operate in the natural 
space environment, engendering trade-offs involving 
part selection, schedule, cost, and risk. While this is 
true for many environmental factors (e.g. thermal 
effects, operation in a vacuum, etc.), radiation threats 
are largely unique to space environments. The 
radiation response of each semiconductor is derived 
from the interaction between the device materials, 
process, design, and architecture; therefore, radiation 
testing has played a crucial role in revealing and 
characterizing vulnerabilities in systems with a family 
tree’s worth of failure modes. For SmallSats, with 
their reliance on a broad range of COTS devices, low 
cost, and schedule constraints; testing every part -- or 
even every critical part -- is not an option.  
When SmallSat missions take place in benign 
environments, undiscovered radiation threats to 
individual parts may pose acceptable risks, 
particularly for failure-tolerant missions. However, 
now that SmallSats are increasingly deployed in 
harsher environments and for more critical missions, 
radiation threats need to be taken more seriously, and 
fault-tolerance design practices are essential. A key 
step toward this goal is the development of a mission 
requirements approach that can be tailored to the 
Mission Environment, Application and Lifetime 
(MEAL). Increased risk tolerance calls for an 
approach that considers cost and schedule while 
providing assurance against radiation threats, which 
facilitates design innovation.  
This paper describes how radiation threats change in 
different radiation environments, how mission 
requirements become radiation requirements, and it 
considers how these changes affect requirements and 
the tradeoffs faced by system and subsystem 
designers. Similarity data (and its limitations) are 
discussed so that caveats and short-comings are 
understood. 
RHA PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The RHA process can benefit SmallSat missions that 
have varied mission profiles and risk postures. It is 
not the process that needs to be altered, but the 
activities associated with the process that can be 
tailored to each mission to defray costs.  
 
Figure 1: RHA Process, where color coded boxes 
group interdependent activities [1]. 
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This process is in part necessary because radiation 
effects come in two distinct manifestations: Single 
Event Effects (SEE) and Mission Dose (both ionizing 
and non-ionizing). The environment stipulations and 
discussion of how RHA deals with emerging 
technologies and COTS components have been 
presented by leading agencies and industry 
partnerships [1-5]. A top-level outline and grouping 
of activities associated with RHA are shown in Figure 
1. The three woven boxes can be succinctly described 
as: 
 Defining and evaluating the hazard  
 Making smart radiation requirements 
 Analyzing the engineering trades 
Each one of these actions can be regarded as an 
engineering effort or interaction that enables team 
communication of objectives and how to achieve 
mission success. The suggested RHA flow can inform 
and benefit the selection of EEE parts for an intended 
application while weighing the radiation risks to the 
system as a whole. The three convolve when 
considering the impact of the mission requirements. 
This process is then iterated for the system as a whole 
when trades are realized, or the environment/design 
need changes as a result. The time and money spent 
on working on RHA can increase the likelihood of 
success by identifying or removing unbound risks to 
the system. 
Clear mission requirements make it easy to identify 
the hazard and determine what constitutes a device or 
system failure. Smart mission requirements make it 
easy to weigh the hazard vs. response and accept risk 
on the basis of categorization. RHA activities beyond 
those are focused on buying down the risk with 
specific data in mind. The true cost savings to 
SmallSat missions is going to come from 
requirements that allow the identification and 
acceptance of risks. 
Define and Evaluate the Radiation Hazard 
Orbits and environments are tied to mission 
objectives: astronomy, heliophysics, planetary, Earth 
science, communications, etc. These objectives also 
become drivers for the launch date and mission 
duration, both of which contribute to the dynamic 
radiation hazard. Typical orbits are referred to as 
LEO, Sun Synchronous, Polar, Equatorial, High Earth 
Orbit (HEO), Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), 
Heliocentric, etc. Most are tied to the inclination and 
altitude of the spacecraft. For the context of this 
paper, Figure 2 shows radiation contributors in three 
selected orbits and mission durations for missions 
with COTS components in mind.  
Because each environment is truly unique, there is 
risk buy down to be gained in defining the 
environment for which the parts of interest are 
intended. For instance, short missions may not have a 
high total dose over the course of the mission life, but 
will still have SEE contributions that interrupt or 
threaten the system. Many passes through the Van 
Allen radiation belts or the South Atlantic Anomaly 
(SAA) can lead to high doses or temporal SEE 
threats, while the protection from Earth’s magnetic 
field can attenuate the number of Galactic Cosmic 
Rays (GCRs) that reach the spacecraft. 
 
Figure 2: Radiation contributions for three general groupings of orbits. These are mapped out for 
different mission lengths leading to notional threat levels, which are relative to one another. 
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In the figure, manageable dose would seldom cause 
parameter shifts in most COTS devices, while 
moderate dose may experience degradation but not 
functional failures, high dose could pose a threat to 
COTS operation. Attenuated GCR refers to the flux 
of particles being reduced by Earth’s magnetosphere, 
and high GCR would be the flux without that 
protection. It can be seen that an increased mission 
lifetime changes the hazard from dose (increases the 
fluence of particles overall), but not the particle 
fluxes that need to be considered for SEE. 
Models of the space environment have been built and 
are maintained by space agencies/industry, and some 
are readily available to the public [5, 6]. The on-orbit 
dose and spectra can be estimated to determine a 
representative model of what a spacecraft will need to 
survive. These types of calculation can be used to 
describe the radiation hazard for mission phases or 
known operating conditions.  
 
Figure 3: Dose-depth plot; ionizing dose 
contributions are transported through spherical 
shielding, the total dose is the summand of all 
contributions. 
 
Figure 4: Emerging Protons during a Solar Event; 
energetic solar protons are transported through 
shielding materials and resultant integral fluxes 
are reported. This flux can be used with data on 
parts to predict a SEE rate during a Solar Event. 
Calculated outputs from these environment models 
that convey two top-level radiation threats in a given 
environment - the dose-depth curve and the emerging 
protons - are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. It is 
important to know the species and population of the 
particles because they ultimately define the hazards. 
These examples have been chosen to highlight the 
aforementioned competing threats for EEE parts in a 
radiation environment: Dose vs. SEE. These two 
plots are not the whole description, but represent how 
one can delve into details about the mission 
environment and its variations. Total Ionizing Dose 
(TID) is accrued over the entire mission life, this can 
lead to wear out or aging of certain device parameters 
causing threshold shifts and leakage that increases 
over time on orbit. Solar events like flares or Coronal 
Mass Ejections can eject in the direction of a 
spacecraft, where inside the emerging protons 
contribute to the SEE event rate. This would be a 
worst case prediction, typically used to mimic what 
particle populations would be seen during a solar 
storm. Nominal SEE rates would be driven by GCR 
as a background, with proton contributions from 
trapped particles as well as solar wind. These spectra 
are available from environment models as well, 
though not shown here. 
In order to define the hazard: 
 Segment the mission into phases where the 
environment or driving requirements have 
unique circumstances (transfer orbits, 
science operation, robotic actions, etc.), this 
can prove to be useful for conceptually 
accepting risks. 
 Determine the contributing particle 
populations to the mission radiation 
environment of trapped charged particles, 
GCR, solar particles. 
 Transport the particle fluence and flux 
through representative amounts of shielding 
materials to determine the environment 
where the electronics will be located, this 
can done for spherical shells of Al and is 
often discussed behind 100mils to first 
order. 
Once the hazards have been identified and there is a 
representative model of what your parts will be 
exposed to, the design can be evaluated for outlaid 
risks. SmallSats do not want to plan for a costly parts 
program with significant margins, so work must be 
put in to make smart requirements based on how 
devices will react to their new environment. Indeed, 
disciplines beyond electrical engineering (i.e., 
Materials, Spacecraft Charging) will benefit from this 
type of analysis/activity as well. For “large” missions, 
a full environment description document serves as a 
reference and one pointer for many disciplines.  
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Make Smart Requirements 
Acceptance of risk is a part of a validated spacecraft 
design. SmallSats by and large have systems and 
subsystems on them that are developed to fit a small 
form-factor and are readily integrated with other 
builds. It would be detrimental to the cost and budget 
of the spacecraft to levy requirements on COTS 
subsystems that require test and analysis unless 
absolutely necessary. Mission requirements should 
flow to subsystems that contain the technologies of 
interest or that have critical functions where risk 
needs to be bounded. Maintaining and managing 
requirements is necessary so that communication and 
trades happen when beneficial rather than existing as 
a method of verification after the fact. 
Mission requirements feed into how the hazard is 
determined (what orbit, launch date), but also help to 
categorize and eliminate risks. Definition of the 
failure levels, with respect to radiation, are where the 
mission requirements and radiation requirements 
overlap heavily. Does mission success rely on one 
subsystem or even one spacecraft? This is where 
good communication between a team can glean costs 
savings on both fronts: analysis resources and the 
need for testing. Figure 5 explains how the RHA 
needs can be tailored to different hazards. If the 
program needs to know the survivability to a 
moderate dose and whether or not single event effects 
are going to interrupt the availability of a subsystem, 
the RHA need would then be high. The higher the 
need, the more budget should be put in place for 
radiation support, and the higher the likelihood of 
requiring specific test data, or needing to test critical 
parts in their application. 
 
Figure 5: Environment and mission requirements 
can determine the RHA system needs 
Radiation requirements (different than the 
overarching mission requirements) need to be based 
on a known hazard, but they also need to take into 
account the design’s functionality and technology. 
Requiring that all parts survive with large margins 
ignores the failure mechanisms for different types of 
parts, and can invoke requirements on materials or 
subsystems that cannot meet them without analysis or 
testing that may not benefit the on-orbit mission risk. 
As such, the mission radiation requirements need to 
be flowed down to the appropriate technologies. 
Establishing the radiation requirements by part family 
will allow quick categorization of risk, and lend itself 
to a targeted analysis. There are no rules of thumb, 
only the physics of failure that can be attributed to 
device process and architecture: Here are the known 
risks to given technologies [8-11], in a notional order 
of risk to the part operation. It is up to the mission 
requirements and design to determine the risk to the 
intended system operation. 
 Destructive single event effects (DSEE): 
parts can either fail to short or open (family 
of effects that permanently damage the 
device and result in it being inoperable). 
 Total Ionizing Dose / Displacement Damage 
Dose (TID/DDD): part shows degradation 
beyond device specifications, looks like 
early wear out mechanisms. 
 Single Event Transients (SET): Can be rail 
to rail voltage or current changes that 
damage peripheral components. 
 Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI) 
that require intervention, depending on part 
type may need a reset signal, or a full power 
cycle. 
 Multi-Bit or Cell Upsets (MBU/MCU) 
where error detection cannot correct, refresh, 
rewrite, or power cycle may be needed. 
 Single Event Transients (SETs) with error 
rates so high that information is lost or 
communications need reset. 
 Single Event Upsets (SEU) can change the 
state of memory cells or switch the state of 
logic level devices. There are also hard 
errors where loss of cell use, masking these 
upsets or the blocks or pages that contain 
them may keep the remainder of the memory 
usable. 
Key factors that need to be considered are the 
criticality and availability of the EEE part in its 
application. In every available opportunity, ask how a 
part response will affect the devices that are 
connected or share failure modes. Ask what impact 
the typical device response would have at the 
subsystem or system level. For a discrete transistor, 
would a gain degradation lead to science loss? Or 
would the device continue to function as a switch? 
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Simply stating that if a part failure is a single strain, 
and if it is critical, can determine the path to mission 
success. 
Analyze the engineering trades 
In evaluating the SmallSat design trades, there are 
significant variables and variation from that of larger 
mission profiles. If the mission is a secondary 
payload, with multiple launch opportunities, would 
the radiation hazard be similar? What would that do 
to the assumptions of the radiation response? How 
would that change the mission phases? Where 
criticality and availability are met with unbound 
radiation risks, it may be beneficial to test if relevant 
data does not exist. Figure 6 weighs the EEE part 
criticality vs. the hazard, with some suggested cases 
that call for mitigation or testing. 
 
Figure 6: Risk posturing for EEE parts with 
critical applications can drive the need to test or 
carry a high risk. If the system impact or 
upset/degradation is not realized above a 
subsystem level, it may be cost beneficial to carry 
the risk. 
The margins a program or project put to use are and 
have been a catchall for uncertainties in many 
contributing analyses. When testing cannot be done 
on the flight lot or in a flight-like application, margins 
need to be applied to account for variability in part 
responses, as well as uncertainty in the environment 
models. 
Radiation testing to buy down risk can be done 
sparingly if the requirements on which parts are being 
examined for flight are specific, rather than blanket 
statements. Radiation threats are unique to a part’s 
architecture. The process of the device, the mask set 
used, the semiconductor material, and sometimes 
even the packaging play a role in the radiation 
response on-orbit. These dependencies strain the 
applicability of data on similar parts, but as data 
accumulates across the community there are 
intentions and attempts to make statistical use in 
order approve of a parts use based on previous 
determinations and findings [13, 14]. Below are some 
descriptions of radiation responses by device family 
and notional impacts: 
 Power Devices – With high voltage comes 
stronger internal electric fields, derating no 
“hard off” states can be the most threatening 
(where a negative gate voltage is applied for 
an NMOS, for instance). MOSFETs can 
experience single event gate rupture (SEGR) 
or single event burnout (SEB). Thicker 
oxides will have greater volume capable of 
trapping charge. 
 Analog Components – some bipolar devices 
will be more susceptible to the dose rate in 
space vs. the accelerated, ground-based 
testing dose rates. Filter SETs on the output 
of the device, if possible. 
 Programmable Logic Devices – responses 
are application-based decisions, don’t add 
triplication and voter complexities if it will 
disrupt the correct operation of your system 
 Complex Digital Components – responses 
are application-based decisions on frequency 
and availability 
 Memories – consider the feature size and 
density and expect SEU/MBU. Control logic 
will have different responses than the 
memory cells and can result in SEFI or 
single event latchup (SEL), if not 
determined. 
 RF/Heterojunction devices – faster devices 
in terms of charge response, therefore, there 
will be fast transients, but the responsivity to 
charge will also result in higher SET rates 
 Opto-electronics – Displacement Damage 
and TID can work in concert to degrade 
performance like charge transfer ratio 
(CTR). Material degradation will impact 
efficiency or optical throughput 
 Mixed Signal – both analog and digital 
concerns in one package. Commercial 
ADCs/DACs exhibit transients and 
functional interrupts, may have digital single 
event effects (DSEE) concerns as well 
 Hybrid Devices – many types of components 
packaged together 
When it comes to testing, consider system level 
impacts to determine the cost benefit of conducting a 
test. Always test in a flight-like application and do 
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not expect results to apply if you are not covering the 
same state-space the mission will cover. There are 
relevant tests for each failure mechanism, but they 
can be considered in the two familiar categories as 
mentioned previously, TID/DD and SEE. The two 
types of radiation tests indeed have sub-categories 
just as the part types and failure modes do. A good 
synopsis on the types of testing and how to conduct 
them are the topic of a number of short courses and 
papers [2-8]. 
SIMILARITY DATA AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
Using available data, rather than conducting a 
radiation test campaign, can be a cost saver. 
Radiation facilities are expensive to maintain and the 
costs show (cyclotron facility costs can be thousands 
per hour). But caution and information need to be 
employed when extrapolating previous results to the 
mission’s end-use of an EEE part. Many of the 
known mechanisms for upsets, failures, or more 
generally the response from the device are tied to 
specific biases, frequency, operating temperature, etc. 
How the testing was conducted needs to envelope or 
represent the mission application in order to be valid. 
Part-to-part variation in response can be attributed to 
the manufacturing process, as can lot-to-lot variation. 
If a manufacturer changes foundries or changes the 
process to increase performance, large changes in the 
radiation response can be seen. These are the drivers 
for desiring lot specific test results. SEE testing or 
data can benefit from the knowledge that a mask set 
and process have not changed (i.e. the sensitive 
volumes are similar and the internal transistors are 
co-located in the same way), whereas TID results are 
much more process oriented with dependencies on 
how oxides and interfaces are manufactured and can 
vary on small deviations in the temperature, doping, 
or chemical process steps. This is based on trapping 
locations within the device like imperfections in the 
oxide or interface. Charge traps are what give rise to 














Figure 7: Diagram of relevant data and relation to 
flight lot representation [13, 14] 
The figure above shows how close to representative 
failure distributions are considered in the realm of 
relevant data. As you take into account data on the 
flight lot for a critical mission, you can also accept 
the risk of part-to-part or lot-to-lot variability on less 
critical subsystems. If you are able to justify previous 
data for the mission application, what can be 
considered useful will inform the decisions of risks to 
accept. The guidelines and recommendations of the 
minimum data necessary to quantify a risk to the 
system can be considered as done in Figure 8. It 
should be noted that, in some instances, ruling out 
destructive single event effects alone may provide 
mission assurance. 
Figure 8: Radiation Data needs for quantifying risk in the represented missions over varied duration. 
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SUMMARY 
Reliability quantification may not always be possible, 
but identifying and classifying the radiation risks will 
inform radiation requirements and trades that are 
most likely to lead to mission success. Taking the 
mission environment, device criticality, and 
technology into account when establishing radiation 
requirements needed to meet mission objectives will 
reduce the workload necessary to verify the system 
design. Risk identification and traceability to system 
responses can alleviate the need to conduct costly 
radiation testing. Where unknown risks pose a threat 
to mission success, there is no substitute for radiation 
testing in the devices’ intended application, 
identifying the physics of failure, and avoiding that 
mechanism where possible in similar devices or 
architectures. Keeping that in mind, when adopting 
previous results on commercial electronics and 
designing with fault-tolerance in mind, it will lead to 
mission success without breaking the bank. 
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